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With the Maastricht treaty, the members of the Eurozone agreed on the 
establishment of a very independent European Central Bank, as well as making their 
National Central Banks far more independent. However, over the years French 
political leaders systematically brought forward proposals undermining the ECB’s 
independence, to the dismay of Germany. A pattern that surfaced again during the 
current sovereign debt crisis and has complicated finding a timely and unified 
answer to the problems.  
The article conducts tests of various factors expected to influence the preference 
for central bank independence. It shows that economic explanations are unable to 
account for the persistent differences amongst European member-states on this 
issue. Instead, cultural differences in attitudes, especially a nation's score on the 
dimension of Power Distance – its acceptance of centralisation of power in a small 
set of political leaders or institutions – does show a correlation with the different 
levels of internalisation of the Central Bank independence norm. 
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The establishment of the Economic and Monetary Union (EMU) has often been ascribed to 
the existence of a Europe-wide consensus on a low and stable rate of inflation as the primary 
goal of monetary policy (see e.g. McNamara, 1998; Marcussen, 1999; Verdun, 2000). 
However, over the years and under the influence of the 2010/11 Euro-zone crisis serious 
doubts have risen whether such ‘sound economic’ ideas are as broadly shared as is sometimes 
argued (Segers and Van Esch, 2007). Of the different principles in EMU guarding its sound 
economic foundations, the consensus on the need for a independent central bank were 
amongst the least disputed. Provisions concerning the functional and political independence 
of the European Central Bank (ECB) were already included in the 1989 Delors Report, and 
were one of the first issues to be settled in the negotiations on the Treaty of Maastricht. 
In this article, we argue that on closer look the apparent consensus on Central Bank 
(CB) independence may have been less widespread and internalised than the institutional facts 
suggest. Despite the similarities in rules and requirements enforced by the Maastricht Treaty, 
member-states –the French and the Germans in particular - differ systematically in their 
attitudes towards the independence of the ECB. Germany and the Netherlands passionately 
advocate the strict independence of the ECB and National Central Banks (NCBs under EMU, 
while the French and other southern states have tried time and time again to balance the 
power of the ECB with a political authority, questioned its mandate and actions, interfered 
publicly in the term of office of the President, and actively tried to influence the ECBs 
actions.
3This article argues that these differences in attitude towards (E)CB independence 
between France and Germany cannot be explained by purely economic interests, and presents 
evidence that suggests that differences in national political culture may provide a convincing 
alternative explanation. More specifically, different attitudes towards CB independence seem 
to be grounded in different national views on the proper degree of hierarchy and centralization 
of political power and policy-making.
1 Such structural cultural differences may well be one of 
the factors underlying the difficulty the EU has been experiencing in finding an adequate and 
timely solution to the current crisis.  
The article is structured as follows. The article continues with a further study of the 
principle of CB independence and illustrates how historically France and Germany in 
particular have held different traditions and attitudes towards CB independence. The third 
section shows that while the establishment of EMU induced a significant institutional 
convergence towards stronger CB independence, the attitudes in the different countries 
towards CB independence continued to diverge. Even after the establishment of EMU, French 
leaders have remained critical of the ECB’s independence, while Germany invariably stressed 
the need for it. Section 4 discusses various explanatory factors of central bank independence 
identified in the literature and investigates to what extent these may offer an explanation for 
this difference in attitude amongst the French and German elite. The article concludes that 
differences in economic interests and political structures themselves cannot explain the 
continued divergence in attitudes. A first test indicates, however that underlying cultural 
differences may provide a more adequate explanation.
1 Dodd (2001) also points to the importance of sociological aspects of the EMU and euro. 
42. Traditions of Central Bank Independence
The various aspects of Central Bank independence can be grouped into two notions: 
functional  independence   and  political  independence   (Masciandaro   and  Spinelli,  1994). 
Functional independence of a central bank increases with the possibility to control quantities 
or prices of money and credit (including credit to the government) and the impossibility to 
practice monetary accommodation. Political independence is positively related to the statutory 
definition of price stability as the main goal; the non-interference of the government in the 
appointment of the members of the board; a fixed and long term of office for the members of 
the board; the absence of representatives of the government on the bank’s board; and the 
availability of a set of well-defined rules for the settlement of any conflict between the central 
bank and the government. 
2.1 Pre-EMU attitudes on CB independence
Historically, EU states differed widely in both their attitude and institutional rules concerning 
Central Bank independence. At one end of the spectrum, the stringent German tradition is 
located, the French dirigism at the other, and with other Euro-zone states falling somewhere 
in between.
The stringency of the German political and financial elite regarding CB independence 
is rooted in Germany’s shared historical and economic experience, and is shared by the 
German public (cf. Kaltenthaler, 2002). The collective memory underlying the German 
position on CB independence is that of hyperinflation and economic crisis between the two 
5World Wars. These experiences induced a great concern for inflation and a preoccupation 
with a strong D-Mark in the German collective memory. 
In the eyes of the German financial elite two conditions need to be fulfilled to 
guarantee price stability. Firstly, states must adopt stringent budgetary and fiscal policies and 
denounce monetary financing of budgetary deficits, as a failure to do so would result in high 
inflation (Dyson and Featherstone, 1999: 276). Secondly, central banks need to have a high 
level of independency to prevent politicians from adjusting monetary policies to further 
(short-term) political and electoral interests, and jeopardise the credibility of the CB.
Moreover, in line with the allies’ view after World War II that centralisation of 
political power in Germany should be avoided, and thus federalised, the fore-runner of the 
Bundesbank, the Bank Deutscher Länder, was already awarded far-reaching autonomy from 
the government (Marsh, 1993: 142-59).
The French, on the other hand, have traditionally adhered to a (more) Keynesian and 
dirigist stand on economic issues. Central to French economic ideas is the conviction that a 
trade-off exists between economic goals like price stability on the one hand and employment 
and economic growth on the other. Strict fiscal and budgetary policies are seen to prevent 
governments   from   using   government   spending   to   stimulate   economic   growth,   reduce 
unemployment, or finance much needed social security measures. In other words, in certain 
circumstances the French consider expansionist government policy – if necessary funded by 
international credits – to be beneficial for the economy and its people.
A second fundamental French conviction associated with this, is the dirigist belief in 
the primacy of the political over the economic. In other words, traditionally the French have 
viewed monetary, budgetary and fiscal policies to be instruments to further political and 
6social goals. Politicians directly chosen by the French people – the French President and 
Members of Parliament – are thus considered the ultimate and legitimate decision-makers. As 
such, monetary, budgetary and financial instruments should be in their hands rather than in 
the hands of unelected financial experts of the (European) central bank. In accordance, the 
Banque de France traditionally has enjoyed much less independence than the Bundesbank. 
Throughout the years, the French have tried to politicize the institutional make-up of 
European monetary policy-making in order to get decision-making transferred to the political 
instead of the technical level.
 
 2.1.1 Pre-EMU Functional Independence 
Historically, the most prominent difference in opinion on the proper level of  functional 
independence of central banks between France and Germany occurred during the negotiations 
on the establishment of EMS.
2 During these negotiations, the independence of the NCB's and 
the conditions under which they would be obliged to intervene in markets became the most 
contentious issue. The French push for the instatement of additional financial support 
mechanisms, and obligatory interventions by the CBs met with fierce opposition of the 
Bundesbank that perceived this to be a threat to monetary stability and a blatant breach of its 
constitutional independence. Ultimately, Bundesbank President Emminger only agreed to 
authorise the establishment of EMS if the Bundesbank was freed from the obligation of 
intervening in any situation when this would jeopardise monetary stability (Van Esch, 2009).  
2 Due to its fragmented political system, it is difficult to speak of a unitary German position on 
European economic and monetary integration. At times, the position German financial elite diverges 
almost as much from that of the German political elite as the French. 
7In the run up, and during the negotiations on the Maastricht Treaty, the debate between 
the  French   and  Germans   concerning   the  functional   independence   of  the  future  ECB 
resurfaced. Guarantees for the formal, personal and political independence of the future ECB 
were formalised early in the Intergovernmental Conference (IGC) (Schönfelder and Thiel, 
1994: 91).
3
However, the actual independence of the ECB did become a point of contention. In 
the opinion of the German financial elite, the French assault on the actual independence of the 
ECB came in three guises: its demands for democratic accountability of the ECB, the 
establishment of an economic government, and the French proposals with regard to external 
monetary policy making (Van Esch, 2007). 
With regard to the democratic accountability of the ECB, the Commission – supported 
by the French – proposed that the future ECB would issue periodic reports to the European 
Council and to the Parliament. To the German monetary experts, however, such a provision 
was an open invitation for politicians to interfere in their domain. The issue was settled in the 
draft statutes of the ECB which provided that the ECB would present an annual report to all 
institutions of the EU, and would publicise regular reports on the activities of the system 
(Schönfelder and Thiel, 1994: 83; Van Esch, forthcoming).
The second issue of contention was the French proposal for the establishment of an 
economic government (Howarth, 2000: 83; Howarth, 2002: 167).
4  As early as 1988, the 
3 According to Szasz (1999: 114) for France accepting an independent ECB “cannot have been an easy 
decision. An independent Central Bank is at variance with French centralist tradition”.
4 French pleas for the establishment of a 'gouvernement économique' should not be regarded as a plea 
for the supra-nationalisation of member-states' economic policies (Van Esch, 2007), as is also apparent 
from the most recent plans along this line of fall 2011 (see Section 3.2.1). French plans to establish a 
8French Finance Minister Pierre Bérégovoy had argued in favour of such a European economic 
government. From the outset, however, there was little chance that the French would be able 
to secure this demand due to opposition by the German financial elite and Chancellor, and 
the European Commission (Mazzucelli, 1997: 65-6; Schönfelder and Thiel, 1994: 78-9). 
Moreover, the French were internally divided on the issue. For some time the plan enjoyed 
the half-hearted support of the French President Mitterrand,
5 but in January 1991 the President 
forced his Minister of Finance to give in (Howarth, 2000: 143).
On the issue of external monetary policy making, the German financial elite argued 
that since external monetary relations have consequences for price stability it should be the 
responsibility of the ECB.
6  The French, however, argued that given its implications for 
general economic policy and the relations between the EU and third countries, external 
monetary relations should be handled by the political authorities (Howarth, 2000: 134). This 
division was only resolved at the last ECOFIN meeting before the Maastricht summit, when it 
was decided that the general guidelines for external monetary policy were to be set by 
ECOFIN, but would not be binding. In Maastricht, it was added that these general guidelines 
'gouvernement économique' are first and fore-mostly motivated by a desire to transfer decision-
making firmly in the hands of democratically elected high politicians rather than the unelected 
‘functionaires’ of the ECB. 
5 Howarth suggests that the issue of an economic government ‘provided a useful bargaining chip in the 
negotiations with the Germans’ (Howarth, 2000: 143).
6 In October 1990, the Bundesbank argued that the ESCB should be given the sole responsibility for 
interventions in capital markets and should have co-decision rights on all other external monetary 
policy decisions.
9should serve the primary objective of the ESCB to maintain price stability (Schönfelder and 
Thiel, 1994: 142; Van Esch, 2007: 303).
Although institutionalised in the Treaty on the European Union, the divergence of 
opinion on the proper level of functional independence kept surfacing after Maastricht. In a 
TV-interview just before the French referendum in 1992, for instance, President Mitterrand 
reiterated the French plead for the instatement of an economic government as a political 
counterbalance to the ‘technicians’ of the ECB who had to implement the decisions made by 
the European Council (Verdun 2000: 134).  
2.1.2 Pre-EMU Political Independence 
The differences in opinion concerning the right level of  political  (E)CB independence 
between Germany and France go back even further to the (failed) negotiations on the 1970 
plan for European Monetary Union, the Werner Report. During the negotiations, the German 
Minister of Economic and Financial Affairs, Karl Schiller – backed by the Bundesbank Rat - 
voiced the hope that a future European Central Bank would be as politically independent as 
the Bundesbank. In contrast, French President Pompidou stressed the need for politicians to 
have political control over the monetary instruments. The level of democratic control over, 
and political independence of the future ECB remained contentious until the end of the 
Werner-negotiations, and ultimately contributed to their failure (Van Esch, 2007: 205-209, 
215). 
A different aspect of political independence, the non-interference of the government 
with the appointments of the members of the board (chief executive officer), has been most 
prominently attacked by French politicians during the appointment procedure of the ECB's 
10first President, Wim Duisenberg. In May 1996, the Presidents of the central banks agreed that 
Wim Duisenberg (at that time President of the Dutch central bank) would succeed Alexandre 
Lamfalussy as President of the European Monetary Institute. In their view, this implied that 
Duisenberg would be the candidate for becoming the first President of the ECB. Aware of the 
great political impact of this decision, the Presidents of the central banks had asked their 
governments’ opinions. Except for France and Italy, all CB Presidents were of the impression 
that their governments would agree. Immediately after the publication of this decision, it 
became clear that President Chirac did not agree. The French government did not accept such 
a decision to be made by non-elected civil servants. 
In May 1998, the heads of states of the EU had to decide on the presidency of the 
ECB. Once again it appeared that France did not accept unconditionally the majority’s 
proposal that Duisenberg would become the ECB’s first President. Chirac wanted the term of 
office of eight years to be split into two of four years, and Duisenberg to sign a document that 
he would step down on January 1
st, 2002. This would introduce the possibility for the French 
candidate Trichet to succeed Duisenberg in January 2002. Duisenberg agreed to sign that he 
would not serve the entire term of eight years, but he refused to announce a date on which he 
would step down. Chirac was upset “Je ne me laisse pas faire chanter par un petit 
fonctionnaire” (De Haas and Van Lotringen, 2003: 25). After a full day of negotiation, 
Duisenberg was elected as the first President of the ECB.
The fact that Chirac preferred another candidate than Duisenberg as such need not be 
at variance with the independence of a central bank. In all systems the President of the central 
bank is appointed by the political leadership. His suggestion to split the term of eight years 
11into two of four years, however, clearly is against a main element of independence. This term 
is long and fixed in order to prevent too much political influence.  
3. Institutionalisation without Internalisation
Despite these historical differences in attitude, the member-states were able to find agreement 
on the Maastricht provisions concerning CB independence relatively easily. In 1999, the 
European Central Bank - the most independent central bank in the world – became fully 
functional (see, e.g. Tavelli et al., 1998). Moreover, with the implementation of the Treaty of 
Maastricht, the NCBs that became members of the ECB had to adhere to stringent unitary 
rules concerning their independence. 
3.1 EMU induced Institutional Convergence
Studies   show   that   the   implementation   of   EMU   resulted   in   the   intended   institutional 
convergence towards a greater level of CB independence across the Euro-zone. The degree of 
central bank independence may be represented by the index of Masciandaro and Spinelli 
(1994).
7  The index of Masciandaro and Spinelli is constructed such that a higher value 
corresponds to a higher degree of independence and provides measurements of the change in 
7  Another often used index of central bank independence is that of Cukierman (1992) and Cukierman 
et al. (1992). Van Lelyveld (2000, Appendix 7-A) presents an updated version of this index, which 
includes changes in the legislation up to 1994. At that time, however, not all countries had brought the 
requirements of the EMU into their national legislation. Results for the Cukierman-index are similar to 
those reported in the text and can be obtained from the authors. 
12the degree of central bank independence resulting from the introduction of EMU (Tavelli et 
al., 1998). The proxy of the pre-EMU level of central bank independence used reflects the 
legislation in force in the year 1990. The EMU level of this index reflects legislation in effect 
in 1997. All the changes in national legislation between these dates were compulsory for 
participation in the EMU. 
Table 1 shows that with the introduction of EMU, the national central banks of 
Belgium, France, Greece, Italy, The Netherlands and Spain have become more independent 
(see columns 1-3), while those of Austria, Germany and Ireland remained their original level 
of independence. With the introduction of EMU a convergence towards a higher level of 
central bank independence thus occurred in the Eurozone. The increase in independence in 
The Netherlands and Spain is mainly due to an increase in functional independence (direct 
credit facilities for the government had to be cancelled). The increase in independence of the 
central banks of Belgium, France, Greece, and Italy is also due to an increase in political 
independence. The change is the largest for Spain, Italy and France. As a result, the level of 
central bank independence in these countries is now only slightly less than in Germany. The 
difference in degree of central bank independence between France and Germany was reduced 
from 6 to 1 point.
<Insert Table 1 about here; full page> 
3.2 Persistent Attitudinal Divergence
13With the implementation of EMU, the institutional level of Central Bank independence in 
France and Germany thus became practically the same. However, despite this institutional 
convergence and the high levels of formal independence of the Banque de France and ECB, 
French behaviour since the start of EMU and during the current Euro-zone crisis suggests that 
true internalisation of the rules amongst French politicians has not occured yet.
8 On various 
occasions, French authorities have shown difficulties with the far-reaching central bank 
independence required under EMU. 
In fact, during the recent financial crisis French politicians argued for the institution of 
a ‘gouvernement économique’ as a political counterpart for the ECB, tried to exert political 
influence over the ECB's policies and an unauthorised mid-term replacement of one of its 
board-members. French criticism has been aimed at both the functional and political aspects 
of ECB independence, and is in stark contrast with the firm adherence to this norm the 
Germans have displayed.
3.2.1 Post-EMU Functional Independence
With regard to the functional independence of the ECB, it is clear that the institution of a 
European economic government – as a political counterpart of the ECB -has remained a 
steady item on the French European agenda since the establishment of EMU. Firstly, as a step 
towards such arrangement, the French succeeded to re-label the Euro-XI the Euro-group. This 
group of the EMU Ministers of Finance meets the day before the ECOFIN meeting and now 
publishes its agenda, holds longer meetings and to holds press conferences after meetings. 
8  For the period January 1999 to June 2011, the evidence is based amongst others on a systematic 
search of articles published in the Financial Times (search-items: “ECB” and “name head of state”).
14In September 2004, the Ministers of Finance of the Euro-group appointed Jean-Claude 
Juncker as their chairman for a term of two years. Although some member-states feared the 
Euro-group President could try to act as a political counterbalance to the ECB, the practise of 
appointing Euro-group President for two and a half years was institutionalised in the Lisbon 
Treaty. In the summer of 2008, President Sarkozy expressed his wish for a Euro-group 
permanent secretariat to strengthen policy co-ordination and for closer contact between the 
Euro-group and the ECB. In October 2008, the French President reportedly sought support to 
assume the chair of the Euro-group, but failed (Hodson, 2009: 239).  
During the 2010/11 Euro-zone crisis, however, many viewed the stabilisation and 
rescue-package as a triumph of Sarkozy, and historical steps towards a European economic 
government (Hall, 2010). In addition to this, during 2010 several French politicians made 
overt calls for decisive steps towards a European economic government. Initially, these calls 
were resisted by the Germany leadership. However, in the fall of 2011, President Sarkozy and 
the German Chancellor Merkel suddenly came up with a bilateral plan for an ‘economic 
government’. Despite its ambitious name, the proposals were fully intergovernmental and 
came down to the plan for the Euro-zone leaders to meet twice a year, and for the euro-
countries   to   include   the  obligation   to   strive  for  a  balanced   budget  in   their   national 
constitutions. During a meeting of the Van Rompuy Taskforce on October 18 2010, French 
Minister of Finance, Christine Lagarde, outlined French reasoning underlying the French calls 
for the economic governance of EMU. In her view, to governance is equal to politics, and an 
essential role has to be played by politicians, rather than the (capital) markets or the unelected 
technical experts in Frankfurt (Bohn & De Jong, 2011: 13)
15In addition, in May of 2010, Sarkozy urged the ECB to follow the example of 
the US Federal bank and buy up Greek government bonds. The German Chancellor Merkel 
and the Dutch government joined ECB President Trichet in denouncing the French calls as a 
direct violation of the ECBs independence. The decision subsequently made by the ECB 
actually to buy Greek government bonds – which according to Trichet was made entirely 
autonomously from French pressures - elicited fierce criticism from economists – amongst 
whom the German President of the Bundesbank Weber. In their eyes, the ECB interventions 
constituted a form of quantitative easing which is in direct violation of the Treaty. It was 
widely speculated that these interventions lead to the resignation of Weber. August of 2011, 
the ECB went even further and bought up  Italian and Spanish bonds preemptively in an 
attempt to prevent their borrowing costs from spiraling out of control. Again this lead to a 
wave of criticism from the German political and financial elite, and the resignation of a 
German member of the ECB Executive Board, Jurgen Stark (Young and Semmler, 2011).
3.2.2 Post-EMU Political Independence
With regard to the terms and appointment of the members of the executive board of the ECB, 
the historical pattern of contention has also continued after the establishment of EMU. In 
April  2001, French  politicians  once again   discussed  the  length  of  the  presidency of 
Duisenberg. President Jacques Chirac and Prime Minister Lionel Jospin publicly urged 
Duisenberg to make clear at what date he would resign as President of the ECB. The French 
head of the European Bank for Reconstruction and Development, Jean Lemiere, even said 
there was an arrangement struck in May 1998 that Duisenberg would serve half of the eight-
years term and then step down in favour of Trichet. The German authorities, Finance 
16Ministry, Foreign Ministry and Bundesbank, were all resolute in declaring that there should 
be no formal commitment on the succession issue (Barber, 2001). 
Early 2011, a public discussion on the desired composition and nationality of the 
members of the ECB Executive Board broke out in the wake of the debate on the succession 
of Trichet. Initially, when the former Bundesbank President Weber was still seen as a possible 
candidate for ECB President commentators criticised the possibility of having two German 
Board-members (Weber and the sitting Board-member Jurgen Stark). When after Weber’s 
resignation, the Italian CB President Draghi was put forward as Trichet’s successor, Sarkozy 
allegedly vowed to support his candidacy only if the second Italian member of the Board, 
Smaghi, would step down to make room for new French member. This clearly represents a 
clear breach of the political independence of the ECB. 
The French have also continued to raise discussion concerning the statutory goals of 
the ECB. In the 2007 election campaign for the French presidency, the two main candidates, 
Ségolene Royal and Nicolas Sarkozy, accused the ECB of paying insufficient attention to 
economic growth. Both asked for changes in the ECB’s statutes to include employment 
protection and growth as its objective (MacShane, 2007). This criticism set off alarm bells in 
Germany (Atkins and Parker, 2007). Sarkozy reiterated his criticism on the ECB’s one-sided 
quest for price stability during the 6-month French Presidency of the EU in 2009. 
More surprisingly, in June 2009 Merkel also criticised the ECB policy in the banking 
crisis. In a marked contrast to the French calls for a change in its primary goals, however, 
Merkel felt the ECB’s decision to buy up to €60 billion of covered bonds from struggling 
banks jeopardized its proper goals and autonomy. Although Merkel thus called for a return to 
17a more independent bank, the simple fact that she uttered criticism was exceptional and 
constituted a breach with German political culture.
In sum, all these events illustrate that, although all member-states have agreed to form 
an   independent   ECB,   from   the   beginning   France   had   difficulties   in   accepting   the 
consequences  of this  independence.  The Germans  accompanied  by  the Dutch  always 
defended the ECB’s independence. Despite enjoying practically the same level of (E)CB 
independence since Maastricht, the attitudes towards this provision thus continue to differ 
markedly. 
4. Understanding Differences in Central Bank Independence
While with the introduction of the EMU the institutional lay-out of France and Germany was 
thus harmonised, their attitudes towards Central Bank independence continue to diverge. As 
of yet, France does not seem to have internalised the norm of (E)CB independence to the 
extent the Germans have. This pattern suggests that – despite the institutional change required 
by the Maastricht Treaty - France and Germany still score very differently on one or more 
structural factors underlying their attitudes towards the degree of central bank independence. 
In the next section, we will discuss various causal factors for explaining central bank 
independence suggested in the literature,  and investigate whether these may offer an 
explanation for this divergence in attitude between France and Germany.
4.1 Central Bank Independence and economic interests
18In the literature, several factors are identified that underlie central bank independence. 
Amongst the variables that are mentioned are: government debt and deficit, checks and 
balances in the political system, and political instability.
9 For each of these factors, we have 
determined to what extent each of these explanations provide an adequate explanation for the 
difference in attitudes towards CB independence found above. 
The first factor that may determine a state’s preference for CB independence is the 
level of the government’s budget deficits and debts (see e.g. De Haan and Van ‘t Hag, 1995; 
De Jong, 2002). Countries with high levels of debt and deficit prefer central banks that are 
branches of the Ministry of Finance so that they can easily monetise government debt. Before 
EMU, France (and Belgium and Italy) passed the debt on to domestic and foreign bond 
holders by inflation and devaluation of the national currency, respectively. Due to the ECB’s 
independence such a strategy is no longer possible. Politicians of these countries regret the 
loss of this inflation / devaluation instrument because they now have to impose fiscal austerity 
on a population used to solving fiscal problems by printing money. 
If this proposition would be correct, France should show much larger deficits than 
Germany. Data, however, do not confirm this hypothesis. Over the 1980s and the 1990s, the 
differences between France and Germany with respect to the government’s net liabilities as a 
percentage of GDP are very small (Table 1, columns 4 and 5). Similarly, the French 
9  In addition to these, the structure of the banking sector and the exchange rate regime are mentioned. 
However, we will not discuss these since France and Germany (as well as the other Euro-zone states) 
have not differed on these variables since the inception of EMS. Therefore these factors cannot offer 
an explanation for the current difference in attitude towards Central Bank independence (De Jong, 
2002; Posen, 1995; Van Lelyveld, 2000: Chapter 7).
19government deficit as a percentage of GDP is not systematically much higher than the 
corresponding German figure (Table 1, column 6). 
The second factor associated with the independence of central banks is the structure of 
the political system. In this view, the legal independence of central banks should be in 
accordance with the rules in the rest of the political system. In a system with extensive checks 
and balances, the central bank is expected to be more independent. France and Germany differ 
on this variable. According to Moser (1999, Table 1), Germany has strong and France weak 
checks and balances (Table 1, column 7). The Netherlands also belongs to the group of weak, 
and Belgium and Italy to that of no checks and balances. For Germany and France the scores 
are not as extreme as to warrant the conclusion that this is the main reason for the differences 
in attitude.
Related   to   the   previous   argument   is   the   hypothesis   that   an   unstable   political 
environment, in the sense that governments are often replaced before the end of their term, 
will lead to a dependent central bank. An unstable political culture is here considered as a 
proxy for lack of discipline by political parties and a high degree of disagreement about the 
preferred institutional setting. Both hamper the establishment of an independent central bank. 
Whilst France is indeed politically more unstable than Germany (see Table 1, columns 8 and 
9), the difference is again not as extreme as may be expected. Moreover, The Netherlands 
with its tradition of CB independence is only mildly more stable than France. Belgium and 
Italy may be categorised as far more politically unstable than France.  
Finally, some authors argue that an independent central bank has to be grounded in a 
society-wide consensus in favour of low inflation (Howarth and Loedel, 2004: 835; Hayo, 
1998;   Van   Lelyveld,   2000:   Chapter   7).   Hayo   and   Van   Lelyveld   use   Eurobarometer 
20respondents’ answer to the question of the importance of fighting inflation to measure such 
anti-inflation consensus. Van Lelyveld uses the answers on the question “Do you think the 
(Insert nationality) government should give higher priority to reducing inflation or higher 
priority to reducing unemployment?“
10 From the answers he derives a measure of relative 
unemployment aversion (see Table 1, columns 10 and 11). The reverse is an indicator of 
inflation aversion. France consistently scores higher than Germany (West) indicating a higher 
degree of inflation aversion in Germany. Once again these differences are not extreme.
All in all, the review of these factors indicates that divergences in economic interests 
and political structure alone cannot adequately explain the pattern of ‘institutionalisation 
without internalisation’ established above. In the next section, we will review to what extent 
an alternative factor, economic culture, may add to our understanding of the Euro-zone 
member-states’ different attitudes towards CB independence.
4.2 Economic Culture and CB independence
As argued above, divergences in economic interests and political structure alone cannot 
adequately explain the continued divergences in attitude toward CB independence amongst 
EMU member-states. De Jong (2002), however, has come up with an alternative hypothesis. 
He proposes that a preference for independent central banks is rooted in deeper layers of 
society, more specifically in its national economic culture. 
10 This method has two drawbacks: Firstly, this question is asked only twice: in 1976 and 1997. 
Secondly, the scores of this relatively direct measure of inflation aversion are likely to be influenced 
by the stance of the business cycle (level of unemployment).
21Culture may be defined as the collective programming of the mind that distinguishes 
the members of one group (country or society) from another.
11  In his research, De Jong 
operationalises the concept culture by applying the dimensions Hofstede derived from an 
employee attitude survey of employees of IBM in 1968 and 1973. Hofstede’s distinguishes 
four dimensions: Uncertainty Avoidance, Individualism/Collectivism, Power Distance and 
Masculinity/Femininity. 
De   Jong   (2002)   finds   empirical   support   for   the   hypothesis   that   central   bank 
independence is negatively related to the dimension Power Distance (PD). PD refers to the 
extent to which the society accepts that power, within its organisations and society as a whole, 
is distributed unequally. In societies with a high PD-score, people perceive that there should 
be an order of inequality in which everybody has a rightful place, and such an order provides 
the best protection for everyone. In societies with a low score on Power Distance people value 
equality high and any inequality of roles is established only for convenience. Studies have 
shown that the score on PD is positively correlated with centralisation of political power and 
political strength (Hofstede, 1980: 97-98).  As such, it may be expected that in high-PD 
countries central banks will be dependent. In other words, PD and central bank independence 
are expected to be negatively correlated. 
Within the group of countries concerned here, France and Germany score at the 
extreme on the PD-dimension: The French score is the highest, whereas the German score on 
Power Distance belongs to the lowest scores (Table 1, column 12). Moreover Belgium and 
Italy belong to the high-PD countries, whereas The Netherlands score low on this dimension. 
11 This and similar definitions of culture are found in Hofstede (1980: 21), DiMaggio (1994: 25), and 
Inglehart (1997). 
22This makes the PD-thesis a plausible alternative explanation for the continued controversy 
between France and Germany on the ECB’s independence from the various explanations 
offered in the literature on central bank independence.
4.3. Exploring the Power Distance- CB independence relationship  
From the previous discussion, the expectation may be derived that a relation between Power 
Distance and central bank independence existed in the Eurozone countries before EMU, 
whilst   it  disappeared   after   the  implementation   of   the  Maastricht   Treaty.   Multivariate 
regression analysis is used to test this proposition.  Our discussion of the German versus 
French attitude towards central bank independence, however, refers to the attitudes of national 
political elites while Hofstede’s survey consists of all sorts of employees of an international 
firm. Hence, one could criticize the results of regressions based on his dataset as not 
representing the view of key actors. In contrast to De Jong (2002), we therefore also test the 
hypothesis by means of Hoppe’s replication of Hofstede’s method to a group of highly 
educated persons. Hoppe used Hofstede’s questionnaire for surveying the alumni from an 
elite conference and training centre, the Salzburg Seminar.
12  For this index the scores of 
France are not as extreme as in the original dataset of Hofstede (Table 1, last column). 
Our study shows that the Hofstede-index of Power Distance has a negative and mostly 
significant influence on the degree of central bank independence in the pre-EMU period (see 
Table 2, upper part, first column) providing evidence for our expectation that central banks 
depend more on politicians in countries that score high on Power Distance. After the 
12 On average the respondents in Hoppe’s survey, conducted in 1984, have five more years of formal 
education than the Hofstede IBM employees. More than two-thirds held doctorates or master’s-level 
degrees (see Hofstede, 2001: 126-127)
23introduction of the legislation required for EMU this relationship disappears: the coefficient 
of PD is positive and insignificant, and the overall fit of the equations is bad (bottom part of 
Table 2).The result is similar but even clearer for Hoppe’s index of elite’s score on Power 
Distance before (Table 3, upper part, first column), and after Maastricht (bottom part of Table 
3). 
<Insert Table 2 and Table 3 about here, full page> 
  As a robustness check additional regressions are run including all explanatory factors 
mentioned in section 4.1.
13  Except for the dummies of the checks and balances in the 
legislative system, all coefficients of other explanatory variables are insignificant in all 
regressions. In most cases Power Distance significantly explains the 1990-index of central 
bank independence, whereas except for one case it does not explain the 1997-index of central 
bank independence. In particular for Hoppe’s elite index, the differences are large between 
central bank independence indices including and those excluding the requirements of EMU 
(Table 3, the differences between the upper and lower part). The fact that along side Power 
Distance, the dummies of checks and balances in the legislative system are the only 
significant factors explaining central bank independence reinforces the idea that the degree of 
centralization of power is crucial.  
The overall conclusion from the regressions is that until 1990 legislation about the 
independence of the national central bank reflected the widely accepted views in societies 
about the degree of concentration of power. This relation vanishes after 1990. The degree of 
13 Since there are ten observations only, each regression can include only few explanatory variables to 
obtain meaningful results. One variable at a time is added to the relation with a constant term and PD.
24central bank independence in the members of the Euro-zone no longer reflects their society-
wide accepted concentration of power. The difference in results for the period before and after 
the changes in legislation due to the EMU requirements, suggests that the new legislation is 
not internalised in the national popular culture and even less in that of the elite. Particularly, 
in states with a tradition of dependent CBs, central banks are now legally more independent 
than accepted by their national culture and their elite’s values. This holds in particular for the 
French,   and   may   explain   their   recurring   criticism   of,   and   efforts   to   reduce   (E)CB 
independence.  
5. Conclusion
The analysis presented in this article provides evidence that culture, and especially a nations 
score on the dimension of Power Distance, may be the most adequate explanation for 
France’s continued difficulty in accepting the independence and legitimacy of the ECB. In 
France (and to a lesser extent in other Latin countries) centralisation of power in a small set of 
political leaders or institutions is considered more legitimate than in Germany and some 
northern states. At the European level these politicians find it hard to accept the authority of 
other governments and independent institutions such as the ECB. So even when EU member-
states find a way to agree on institutional change and implemented these changes, the 
underlying attitudes and political cultures may not change accordingly, at least not readily.
While the point of the article is made in the context of central bank independence in 
Europe, the role of cultural differences on political attitudes underlying institutional realities 
25may have wider applicability. For example, cultural differences may also help to explain the 
different reactions in Germany and France to the 2008/9 banking and the current sovereign 
debt crisis on other aspects, or shed light on the EU’s difficulty to come up with a coordinated 
response to the Euro-zone crisis. The argument put forward in this article, suggest that a more 
profound convergence of the member-states’ attitudes on both means and ends may be needed 
for successful and sustained coordination and implementation of European policies to be 
possible. Since Europe is characterized by a large variation in national cultures, and these may 
partly inform member-states policy-preferences, this is no easy task.  
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31Table 1: Central bank independence and some explanatory variables   
  
Country  Central bank  independence  Government debt   Political  RUA  Power Distance 
Masciandaro & Spinelli debt  deficit  instability Hofstede Hoppe
1990 1997 change 1980s 1990s 1990s  C&B Change Sign  1976  1997
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10) (11) (12) (13)
Austria 9 9 0 -23.8 -36.2 -2.5 w 2 3 - 1.33 11 43
Belgium 7 10 3 -101.3 -95.6 -1.3 n 4 8 1.15 1.48 65 50
Finland  9 9 0 16.6 35.3 1.9 w 3 4 - 1.57 33 38
France 7 12 5 -39.8 -39.5 -1.6 w 4 6 1.20 1.48 68 47
Germany 13 13 0 -38.2 -39.6 -2.9 s 1 4 1.12 1.43 35 39
Greece 4 8 4 -37.5 -82.1 -5.1 w 3 5 - 1.42 60 61
Ireland 7 7 0 -95.8 -14.1 1.3 w 5 5 1.24 1.33 28 38
Italy 5 11 6 -67.0 -97.0 -3.5 n 6 10 - 1.42 50 55
Netherlands 10 12 2 -55.9 -39.4 -1.3 w 3 5 1.39 1.29 38 34
Spain  5 12 7 -29.2 -41.0 -1.3 w 1 4 - 1.70 57 48
Sources: Central bank independence: Masciandaro and Spinelli (1994) and Tavelli et al. (1998:  343), government debt in the 1980s: De Haan and Van ‘t Hag (1995, 
Appendix), Government debts and deficits during the period 1995- 2007: Eurostat, Summary Table Consolidated General Government, C&B is a measure of checks and 
balances in the legislative system, coding: s=strong, w=weak and n=no checks and balances: Moser (1999, Table1), Change is the frequency of government changes during 
the 1980s, SIGN is the frequency of government changes when another party comes into power: De Haan and Van ‘t Hag (1995, Appendix), RUA is the Relative 
Unemployment Aversion, the higher the number the higher (smaller) aversion for unemployment (inflation), Van Lelyveld (2000, Table 7.1), Power distance: Hofstede 
(2001).Table 2: Central bank independence and power distance (Hofstede) 
(a) (b) (c) (d) (e)
Before changes in legislation: 1990
Constant 11.22 11.93 11.88 12.57 8.98 15.18
term (6.15) (4.92) (5.27) (4.98) (3.12) (14.0)
Power- -8.14 -7.88 -6.63 -7.13 -8.08 -6.22
Distance  (2.43) (2.20) (1.48) (1.81) (2.37) (2.01)
Additional  -.016 -.024 -.563 2.260 -5.27
Variable  (0.63) (0.68) (1.02) (1.07) (7.46)
No checks and -5.60
Balances (3.71)
R
2 (adjusted) 0.22 0.14 0.14 0.25 0.31                0.52
After changes in legislation: 1997
Constant 8.85 10.52 9.89 9.21 8.59 11.48
term (5.85) (6.15) (4.36) (5.90) (2.22) (9.47)
Power 3.25 5.61 3.15 0.04 3.20 4.34
Distance  (1.12) (2.44) (1.04) (1.10) (1.05) (1.26)
Additional -.035 -.413 -.947 0.224 -3.45
Variable (1.91) (0.94) (0.59) (0.09) (4.21)
No checks and -3.48 
Balances (3.21)
R
2 (adjusted) -0.0 0.15 -.08 -.11 -.16 0.07
Additional variables: (a) debt as a percentage of GDP, (b) number of changes of governments during the period 
concerned, (c) number of government changes where there new cabinet consists of other parties, (d) exchange 
rate regime; his index runs from 0 (fixed exchange rate) to 2 (fully flexible exchange rate), and (e) weak checks 
and balances. The coefficient of Power distance has been multiplied by 100 in order to improve the presentation. 
The numbers between brackets represent t-values of the coefficients. The standard errors of the estimated 
coefficients are corrected by means of White’s method for correcting heteroscedasticity.   
 Table 3: Central bank independence and power distance (Hoppe) 
(a) (b) (c) (d) (e)
Before changes in legislation: 1990
Constant 18.91 19.62 18.90 19.38 16.64 21.46
term (6.48) (6.29) (6.22) (7.51) (5.51) (14.76)
Power- -25.0 -24.6 -24.0 -22.9 -24.7 -21.69
Distance  (4.62) (4.96) (4.15) (4.68) (5.09) (5.82)
Additional  -.017 -.081 -.433 2.189 -4.600
Variable  (0.74) (0.42) (0.83) (1.55) (7.79)
No checks and  -4.073
Balances  (6.22)
R
2 (adjusted) 0.56 0.54 0.51 0.58 0.69 0.82
After changes in legislation: 1997
Constant 11.89 11.21 11.74 12.09 11.62 13.97
term (3.05) (2.51) (2.82) (2.99) (2.67) (3.63)
Power -3.51 2.45 -1.06 -3.32 -5.17 -2.47
Distance  (0.44) (0.21) (0.12) (0.39) (0.57) (0.25)
Additional -.026 -.401 -.464 0.810 -3.020
Variable (1.00) (0.86) (0.32) (0.43) (2.63)
No checks and -2.166 
Balances  (1.51)
R
2 (adjusted) -0.10 -0.13 -.19 -.24 -.23 -.12
See note Table 2. 
 